As more criminals are imprisoned, other individuals change their behavior to replace them, as predicted by the theory of strategic behavior. The physiological correlates of sociopathy suggest that research in cognitive neuroscience can lead toward a solution. Promising pathways include building upon current knowledge of self-deceit, the independence of positive and negative emotions, the lateralization of risk and caution, and the conditions promoting prosocial behavior.

The paper describes at length and then discusses critically Frederick Schauer's analysis of rules in his recent book Playing By the RuZes. For most of the book Schauer discusses rules in general, and only at the end talks about legal rules in particular. The chief message of Schauer's analysis is that rules permit, and even constitute, a particular kind of decision‐making, one that quite deliberately insulates the decision‐taker from considerations of what would be in the circumstances the best justified decision (...) to take. Rules are thus for Schauer devices for the allocation of decision‐making power: The effect of A delegating to B the power to decide by a set of rules devised by A is that A retains much control over B 's decision‐making. Schauer canvasses the claims of what he calls “presumptive positivism” to be a theory of law which embodies such a view of legal rules. In his criticism, the author compares Schauer's view with Joseph Raz's notion of legal rules as exclusionary reasons. The author then compares “presumptive positivism” with some other recent versions of positivism and the idea of rules as devices for the allocation of power with theories of law in the Critical Legal Studies movement. (shrink)

It is something of a commonplace of Butlerian interpretation that the main interest and achievements of Butler's moral philosophy are in normative ethics, and not metaethics. He wishes to bring moral enlightenment to citizens and not, to philosophers, epistemological enlightenment. Nonetheless for that he makes a number of remarks which, if we were collecting for some bizarre purpose metaethical forms of words, we would note down and include in our collection. Thus he makes some progress towards the development of a (...) moral epistemology, a theory of moral judgment. My purpose here is to assess those steps, and to see how far the structure which results can be called a theory. I have the impression that much of the reluctance among scholars to allow that Butler does have a theory of moral judgment is caused by the metaethical blinkers that they themselves wear; what is in fact the beginnings of an unfashionable and unconventional theory is seen as unsophisticated confusion. But I shall not overdo praise of Butler. I shall suggest that Aristotle does a somewhat better job of developing this type of theory. (shrink)

It has been claimed that there are certain acts that nurses as people practising nursing must never do because they are nurses and this is regardless of what the same agent should do; that certain actions are not part of proper nursing practice. The concept of an internal morality has been discussed in relation to medicine and has been used to ground the actions proper to medicine in a realist tradition. Although the concept of an internal morality of nursing is (...) not explicitly mentioned in the literature the underpinning ideas about the proper practice of nursing based on philosophical realism I argue equate with it and a discussion of the method of an internal morality can help to understand how arguments against euthanasia related to the profession of nursing are far from clear. Ultimately, although the idea of particular acts proper to nurses qua nurses is not clear, the concept of an internal morality can help to get practitioners to see how the profession is tightly linked to moral actions, even so the hard problems in bioethics such as the morality of euthanasia remain hard for all and the easy ones easy for all. (shrink)

A model for the quantum measurement of the electronic current in a Josephson junction is presented and analyzed. The model is similar to a Stern-Gerlach apparatus, relying on the deflection of a spin-polarized particle beam by the magnetic field created by the Josephson current. The aim is (1) to explore, with the help of a simple model, some general ideas about the nature of the information which can be obtained by measurements upon a quantum system and (2) to find new (...) approaches for obtaining information about the nature of the states of a macroscopic quantum system. In the case of sufficiently strong coupling between the system and the apparatus, we find that the model provides in principle a standard ideal measurement of the value of the instantaneous Josephson current. In the case of weak coupling, where the measurement is not ideal, we show that the scattering of neutrons from a junction can in principle be used to measure the average value of the Josephson current, thereby allowing an experimental distinction to be made between an eigenstate of relative phase and one of relative Cooper pair number. The possibility of the latter type of measurement suggests an experimental approach to answer a question of fundamental interest, namely whether two isolated superconductors (or superfluids) possess a definite relative phase or a definite relative number of superconducting (or super/lowing) particles. (shrink)

RADICAL THEOLOGIANS RIGHTLY SEE THAT THE EXISTENCE OF GOD IS NOT AN EMPIRICAL THESIS, BUT THEIR RESULTANT REINTERPRETATION OF MIRACLES IS UNRECOGNIZABLE TO ORTHODOX THEOLOGY. IS THIS A SYMPTOM OF A MORE PROFOUND PHILOSOPHICAL DIFFICULTY? JOHN WISDOM HAS SHOWN THAT QUESTIONS OF FACT MAY NOT NEED FURTHER EMPIRICAL ENQUIRY BUT STILL NEED SOLUTION AND STILL BE ABLE TO BE RATIONALLY PURSUED. IS THEN THE LESSON TO BE LEARNED FROM RADICAL THEORIES OF THE MIRACULOUS THAT MIRACLES CAN BE EVIDENCE IN PATTERNS? (...) I ARGUE NOT EVEN THIS IS POSSIBLE. FAITH, RELIGIOUS OR SECULAR, IS REQUIRED ALSO TO SEE A MIRACLE IN A PATTERN OR TO SEE NONE. THE BELIEVER AND NON-BELIEVER ARE PLAYING CHECKERS WITH THEIR PIECES ON DIFFERENT COLORED SQUARES. (shrink)

This paper will examine a claim that nursing is united by its moral stance. The claim is that there are moral constraints on nurses' actions as people practising nursing and that they are in some way different from both what for now can be called standard morality and also different from the person's own moral views who also happens to be a nurse, hence the defining and unifying factor for nursing. I will begin by situating the claim within the broader (...) area about the need for a definition to state features that are essential to all and only members of its class. This will highlight the fact that there are two distinct types of definition used by authors seeking to find a unity for nursing. One type of definition has to do with goals or purposes given to nursing and the other with ends discovered as nursing. But even if there are ends waiting to be discovered a particular practical concern is how we can have knowledge of them. I will suggest that knowledge by intuition is plausible but that as things currently stand in moral epistemology it will not provide the unifying ground for nursing. Then I will argue that in the latter approach to definition a certain account of human nature has been advanced in order to provide features that are there to be discovered and so not dependent on human beings for the definition or classification. However, such an attempt to define nursing cannot do what is wanted. Rather than the account of human nature grounding morality and doing so for nursing, the account of human nature itself relies upon a prior account of morality. Because of this it loses its supposed ground of unity for the profession. Nursing is not united by its moral stance especially if this is understood in a strong sense as unique moral stance, but as things currently stand in moral epistemology this is not necessarily a bad thing for practitioners or patients. (shrink)